punjab-crisis

Punjab Crisis: An Analysis

By S. Gurpreet Singh Dhillon

Purpose

The purpose of the following analysis is to examine the Punjab crisis by focusing on economic issues in the Sikh conflict with the central government. By examining the economic grievances of the Sikhs, I hope to demonstrate the legitimacy of Sikh claims of unjust treatment by the Indian government.

The analysis will be divided into two main categories. The first part discusses background issues of the crisis in a generalized format. Non-economic elements of the conflict will be highlighted. The second section of the paper narrows the analysis by focusing on the genesis of the core of the economic grievances of the Punjabi Sikhs. The interaction of the Indian government and the Sikhs relative to the economic issues raised is also analyzed in the second section. Thus the ramifications of political and economic decrees by the central government are discussed. Finally, conclusions as to the study conducted are presented.

PART I

Background

Incidents involving the movement for an independent Sikh homeland have received much media attention, especially since the attack on the Golden Temple by the Indian army in 1984. Much of the debate on the issue of Khalistan, the name of a proposed independent Sikh nation, has thus focused on events since the early 1980s. The struggle against the Indian government has been portrayed as a religious conflict based on Hindu-Sikh religious differences, and a campaign without merit, propagated by Sikh leaders interested in creating a Sikh Raj. However, such a characterization of the Khalistan movement is overly simplified and inaccurate. The Sikh movement for independence from India is multidimensional, with religious, historic, political, and economic grievances at the core of the struggle. Further, the issues inherent in these categories are deeply rooted in Sikh history in India and date much prior to the limited frame of reference which often begins in the early 1980s. Specific unconstitutional, unprecedented and inconsistent governmental actions, beginning soon after independence, appear to be discriminatory against the Sikh community. Such actions, focused on the state of Punjab, where Sikhs represent a majority of the population, encompass and threaten Sikh beliefs, institutions, and traditions as well as the economic and political security of Sikhs in Punjab. Thus, familiarity with, and an understanding of the interrelatedness of the religious, historic, economic and political aspects is necessary in formulating an accurate assessment of the legitimacy of the Sikh struggle against the government of India.

A basic and quintessential misconception, which exists even today, centers on the unique principles of Sikhism and the inherent differences therein as related to Brahmanical theory and practice. The Sikh philosophy spelled out by Guru Nanak represented a monumental break with religious and spiritual theory and practice in the subcontinent. Guru Nanak pronounced that God, whether called Ram, Allah, or any other of the multitude of names used for the Almighty, is the same God for all. Thus the concept of tolerance and respect for all religions was introduced. Another facet inherent in Guru Nanak's pronouncement was equality and respect for women. Until Guru Nanak appeared, prevailing religious theory considered women temptresses and they were consequently treated as subordinates. The Almighty would judge one only on the basis of one's actions; therefore, Nanak's teachings were to be practiced in deed more importantly than in word. Guru Nanak went beyond only preaching such concepts of Sikhism. Equality, tolerance, and respect for all were commanded not just in word but were incorporated into daily practice.

Inherent in Guru Nanak's philosophy is direct contradiction to the Hindu concept of life and man's role on earth. While in Hindu philosophy the "progression" of man leads ultimately to detachment form and renunciation of the world, Sikhism proscribes a proactive role in worldly affairs. Guru Nanak established the Sikh faith with a clear set of universalistic principles which Sikhs would be taught to relinquish at no price. This identity would be directly threatened by various forces and means throughout history, with those political actions of the post independence government most relevant to the issues of an independent Sikh homeland.

The religious and social principles established by Guru Nanak and the succeeding nine Gurus are significant in any analysis of the struggles involving the Sikhs. In keeping with the more contemporary aspects of the topic, however, much of earlier Sikh history, involving persecution by ruling entities, will be bypassed. A discussion of the more contemporary Sikh struggles for retention of distinct institutions provides an introduction to the type of centrally propagated measures undertaken against Sikh principles which challenged Brahmanical Hindu customs. Such acts progressively aimed closer to the heart of Sikh institutions and security as India matured after independence.

The struggle for regaining control of their gurdwaras after the fall of Ranjit Singh's empire in the mid 1800s offers a prime example of the multidimensional nature of attacks on Sikh security in India. Prior to the decline of Maharajah Ranjit Singh's empire, Sikhs were forced into the forests and jungles of northern India for safety from attacking marauders. As the established gurdwaras often lacked knowledgeable Sikh caretakers, they were left vulnerable to the introduction of Hindu rituals initiated by Sahajdharis, non-Sikhs who systematically took control of the religious services in the gurdwaras. Paramount to the Sikhs' vulnerability in this instance is Guru Nanak's deliberate non inclusion of a priest figure in Sikh religion. The ritual practices of Brahmans, the priestly upperclass, had been used to enforce the distinction between classes and castes and thus were forbidden by Guru Nanak. Sahajdhari encroachment into the vacated gurdwaras allowed the very acts disavowed by Nanak to creep into Sikh practices. The Sahajdhari influence carried over into British rule, as a class of hereditary gurdwara "managers", Mahants, were allowed control of the gurdwaras. The Mahants continued anti-Sikh Hindu ritual practices in the gurdwaras while often taking money form worshipers and living lavishly off such exploitation, in traditional Brahamanical fashion and completely contrary to Guru Nanak's teachings. Such conditions led to a five-year struggle for control of the gurdwaras in which 30,000 Sikhs were arrested, 2000 wounded, and 1,100 killed over a period of five years ending in 1924.⁽¹⁾ However, the effect on the Sikh population carried over into other spheres as well.

As a result of fines and elimination of pensions of Sikhs in the army and civil service, the proportion of Sikhs in the armed service dropped from 20 percent around 1900 to 13 percent by 1930. The cost to Sikhs for upholding the sanctity of basic religious principles ultimately spread to the economic realm of Sikh life, as the livelihood afforded by a martial career was ended for a large percentage of the Sikh population.

The struggle for control of the Sikhs' own religious institutions represents the typical sacrifices Sikhs have been forced to undertake in defense of the most basic of principles. This struggle, which occurred during British rule, ended in a victory of sorts for the Sikhs, with the establishment of the SGPC, an elected committee of Sikhs given control over sovereign Sikh religious institutions. However, in the view of many Sikhs, the genesis of the issue, that of an attempt to rupture the viability of distinct Sikh practices, is one that carried over into post independence India.

Maintenance of a viable Sikh community in Punjab became paramount to Sikh leaders in light of the pre independence history described. As M.J. Akbar points out, "If the Indian Muslim was destroyed, Islam would still survive, whether in southeast Asia, central and west Asia, or Africa. But Sikhism had no geographical base apart from the Punjab."⁽²⁾ The significance of the Sikh population in Punjab is thus made clear. Solemn assurances by Indian officials played the decisive role in the decision of Sikhs to cast their lot with the Hindu majority and become a sovereign part of India. In the words of Nehru in 1944, "The brave Sikhs of Punjab are entitled to consideration. I see nothing wrong in an area and a set up in the North wherein the Sikhs can also experience the glow of freedom." Such assurances date back even further, as Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru and other leaders issued the following statement in 1929: "After India has achieved political freedom, no constitution will be framed by the majority unless it is freely acceptable to the Sikhs."⁽³⁾ The timing of this statement coincided with the effort of constructing a viable Union of India Congress, and appeared to be an attempt to use the Sikhs to strengthen Indian resistance to the British. Based on this, and other similar statements, Sikhs decided to join the Congress Party and thus boosted significantly its strength in pre-independence days. Such assurances of Sikh sovereignty can be quoted ad nauseam. Sikhs were told that despite the history of attacks on Sikh institutions in the past, the sanctity of the Sikh religion would be protected in an independent India. Despite such promises, Sikhism faced officially propagated discriminatory acts immediately after independence.

Post-independence political acts by the Congress party directly threatened the viability of the Sikh population in Punjab. The politics of the Center struck at Sikh security via discriminatory and threatening measures encompassing the Sikh identity. In the 1950 drawing of the constitution, Sikhs were categorized as Hindus, along with Buddhists and Jains. Further the Sikh "Anand Marriage Act" was replaced with the "Hindu Marriage Act" in 1955. Given the clear contrasts between Hindu and Sikh philosophy and practice, specifically regarding the egalitarian nature of male-female relations in and out of marriage, as opposed to the progressive detachment from family (including wife) and ultimately, the world, by Hindu teachings, such acts were perceived as a serious threat to the Sikh identity. And since the subcontinental partition in 1947, political pressures from Delhi for the Sikhs reabsorption into Hinduism have inevitably become stronger.⁽⁴⁾ Acts by the Congress party involving the States Reorganization Commission of 1955 support the above observation.

After passing resolutions committing India to a union of states based on linguistics and cultural boundaries prior to independence, the Congress party acted inconsistently when demarcating states. While linguistically based boundaries were enacted for states in South India, Punjab was not given similar treatment. Despite the creation of other states linguistically, the States Reorganization Commission recommended specifically against a Punjabi speaking state. Amid the backdrop of the Hindu revivalist movement, Punjabi speaking Hindus disowned Punjabi as their mother tongue. With powerful ties between government officials and Hindu groups, such groups "not only opposed the demand for a Punjabi Suba (state) but also suggested that the existence of Khalsa was no more necessary and that Sikhs should come back into the Hindu society and be absorbed in it. During the 1951 census, they persuaded the Hindus to state Hindi instead of Punjabi as their mother tongue to thwart the demand of Punjabi Suba on linguistic basis."⁽⁵⁾ Thus, the initial demarcation of Punjab based on the 1951 census was conducted with a decidedly anti-Sikh design with the complicity of the Center. In effect Punjab became the only bilingual state in the union with Hindi and Punjabi as the official languages. (A similar setup in Bombay was only temporary). The message from the Center to Sikhs was thus a denial to Punjabi speaking people, the majority of whom were Sikhs, of a potentially formidable political and economic presence attainable through the democratic framework created elsewhere. Only after the 1962 and 1965 wars with China and Pakistan, respectively, during which the Sikhs temporarily put aside their demand for a Punjabi speaking state and fought for India, did the government attempt to redress the inconsistency of the 1956 Reorganization.

The 1966 Punjab Reorganization Act partitioned Punjab, thus creating Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, based on linguistic distinctions. A similar action would appear to have been the proper course of action in the initial reorganization.

The Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966, while purportedly redressing the flaws of the post-independence census, threatened the economic security and potential of Sikhs in Punjab. Central control of Punjab's water and energy resources allowed by the Act ushered in a governmental policy that stifled the economic progress of Punjabis, specifically that of the Sikhs.

The importance of the role of Sikhs in making Punjab India's most prosperous and economically successful territory cannot be understated. Fifty percent of the Sikhs who migrated from western Punjab (Pakistan) were essentially uprooted, and left behind a richer and more agriculturally productive land than the area in India in which they had to resettle.⁽⁶⁾ Sikhs, as the biggest landowners in Punjab, played the key role in developing the state's agricultural resources. Until recently, Punjab provided 60 percent of the country's surplus grain.⁽⁷⁾ Self sufficiency and individual effort of the predominately Sikh farmers were important. "No economist denied that there had been overall prosperity, thanks to individual enterprise, an assured irrigation base, and the wonders of modern agricultural science".⁽⁸⁾

PART II

The role of the "green revolution" in the economic tensions in Punjab is important. The following section discusses the green revolution in India, specifically Punjab. The goals and requirements of the green revolution and its impact on Punjab's economy will be described. Once the background issues of the green revolution have been laid out, the political factors influencing central government interactions with Punjab state government, specifically the Akali Dal (the Sikh political party), will be discussed.

What is the Green Revolution?

The green revolution refers to the development and implementation of synthetically engineered types of food grains developed by Dr. Norman Borlaug.⁽⁹⁾ Although research and implementation of green revolution techniques in agriculture originated in the U.S. prior to WW2, Mexico became the proving ground for the new technology, and by the early 1960s, the third world, particularly India, sought replication of the successes in green revolution agricultural techniques found in Mexico.

High Yield Varieties (HYV) were the focus of the green revolution. HYV refers to the seeds that produced shorter forms of plants which converted fertilizer more efficiently than the taller traditional forms in the production of many crops, particularly wheat. The promise of the green revolution was thus increased production of a variety of foodgrains in the Third World. The possibility of bringing increased self sufficiency in food production with subsequent improvements in the prosperity of peasants in many developing and politically unstable countries existed.

The positive expectations of the green revolution technology appear mostly on a broader, generalized scale of considerations. The ability of the developing world to increase plant productivity would help feed millions and ease the burden of rapidly increasing populations. Simultaneously, rural peasants would experience economic prosperity as a result of higher crop yields. The prospect of feeding millions worldwide encouraged scientists and many third world governments. In this light, the Indian government launched the New Agricultural Strategy in the mid 1960s, in the hopes of expanding upon the successes realized in Punjab. Previous indigenous cropping patterns were replaced with the new "miracle seeds" of the green revolution.

The green revolution scientists and the American proponents of the new technology are criticized on a number of fronts, however.⁽¹⁰⁾ The geostrategic political motives of the western capitalist exporters of green revolution technology were questioned by critics. The belief that unstable, newly independent governments were vulnerable to rural, peasant-based leftist insurgency is cited as a concern of the democratic west. The green revolution was a means of stemming such political uprisings. By bringing economic gains to the countryside, potential political animosity toward the central governments would be defused. A criticism related to the previous item but perhaps more compelling, is an economic exploitation theory. As the success of the new seeds depended on chemicals and fertilizers produced mainly in the developed west, an argument pointing to the creation of a relationship in which the third world governments would become inextricably linked to multinational chemical producers was put forth. Thus, the humanitarian motives cited earlier were interpreted by critics as profit and control motives. Finally, given the necessity of intense fertilizer and chemical use, as well as intense irrigation, potential ecological degradation was cited as a tangible negative byproduct of the green revolution. Thus pros and cons of green revolution methods existed and both were borne out in the Punjab case. What was not widely anticipated or forecast, however, was the political volatility which currently exists and largely originated as a consequence of the green revolution.

The issue of equality is central to the study of the Punjab crisis. Critics suggest that green revolution demands on natural resources created inequality in access to necessary inputs. Indeed, new input demands in the areas of natural resources and credit necessary for implementation of HYV were important in Punjab. Thus cooperatives were established in an attempt to facilitate the equitable spread of new technology to all farmers, large and small scale. Critics cite the cooperatives in Punjab as "elite controlled", and thus heavily biased toward large scale production in terms of access to inputs such as fertilizer, tubewells for irrigation, and bank financing. However, while acknowledging a class bias in terms of control of rural cooperatives in Punjab during the 1960s-1970s, the allotment and spread of inputs was not biased toward the larger scale farmer per se.⁽¹¹⁾ The coops were shown to have had a marginal role in causing unequal access to inputs inside the state. Instead, inequalities between small and large scale farming operations were caused by population pressure and irrigation shortfalls.⁽¹²⁾

The 21% population increase in Punjab between 1961 and 1971 is cited as the most plausible explanation of the increase in the number of small farm holdings.⁽¹³⁾ The population increase in Punjab is also a central factor in the dynamics of the grievances of Punjabi Sikhs against the government. However, more relevant to the claims of unfair treatment by Sikhs in Punjab and more plausible a factor in the state-state and center-state disputes involving the green revolution, is the issue of water control.

Irrigation

Criticism of green revolution technology is validated in terms of disruption of natural environmental balances. The most compelling evidence of such concern is demonstrated in the new irrigation requirements created by the usage of HYV seeds in Punjab.

Punjab, which literally means "five rivers", depends vitally on its river waters for sustenance of agriculture, which is the lifeblood of its people. Punjab was well-irrigated long before the implementation of green revolution methods. Indigenous crops utilized natural drainage patterns. The necessity of intense irrigation to support the new varieties of seeds was predicated on their need for large volumes of water year-round. The indigenous Punjabi crops utilized the natural seasonal rainfall patterns and growing seasons. The shift from traditional "protective" to "productive" irrigation created an estimated 300% increase in irrigation water needs.⁽¹⁴⁾

By working along the relatively flat natural topography of Punjab's land, traditional irrigation systems, including canals, avoided problems with waterlogging and consequent salination of growing areas. However, the new system necessitated irrigation mechanisms which ran against the natural layout. The increased demand for water by farmers called for the utilization of canal systems dependent on the channeling of river waters along artificial man made routes. The new irrigation patterns brought problems of waterlogging and salination.

The option of returning to pre-revolution crops and cropping patterns was obviously not acceptable to either the farmers or the central government. The gains in output by the Punjabi farmers, and the prosperity realized in the state, made returning to the traditional ways out of the question. The center would hardly backtrack on the heavy investments and planning for green revolution utilization it had made. The options for changing drainage patterns proved difficult also. The "vertical" drainage method, which called for increased use of subsurface tubewells and canal systems proved highly expensive and uneconomical, and was largely abandoned. "Horizontal" drainage techniques were proposed. But this plan proved socially infeasible as systems running across boundaries and massive coordination efforts, including financial, were unrealistic. Thus, concerns over an upheaval of natural balances, especially that of soil ruination and depletion of the natural water table, as a result of intense irrigation requirements, proved valid and prevalent in Punjab. However, the relevant issue brought out in the irrigation discussion is the necessity of large scale water storage capacity and irrigation systems for sustenance of green revolution cropping patterns. Construction of new dams serving multiple states required centralized financing, planning, and coordination. The grand scale of such projects caused the central government to become involved the previously autonomous affairs of the states involved. The issue of water control is central to the Punjab conflict with the central government and highlights the influence of political considerations in dealing with economic issues.

Water Control and Center-State Conflict

In the conflict over resource control, specifically water, in the Punjab crisis, entities aside from Punjab and the central government got involved. The players relevant to the Punjab crisis are Punjab, the bordering states of Haryana and Rajasthan, and the central government. All three states are located in northwest India and use waters from the three main rivers in the region, the Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas. At issue are the rights of each state as to usage of water available from the rivers. The areas of dispute can be listed as follows: (1) quantity of water available; (2) share of available water per state; and (3) mode of distribution of water.⁽¹⁵⁾

The basis of Punjab's dispute over use of the Sutlej and Beas rivers is the 1966 Punjab Reorganization Act. Sikhs were granted a majority Punjabi speaking state by the Act, which created the states of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh by dividing the previously demarcated Punjab. The Act also stipulated that the central government would take charge of all aspects of water control of the Punjab Rivers. Key aspects of central control included the three criteria listed, as well as the ability to decide on any inter-state disputes involving use of the water. Decisions by the government were binding and final. Further, centrally imposed ceilings over pricing of agricultural production of Punjabi farmers were established along with restrictions on exporting of agricultural produce to other states.⁽¹⁶⁾

At the time of the Act, the green revolution was in full swing, with investment and planning for expansion of HYV techniques in Punjab as well as the river bordering states of Rajasthan and Haryana. The demand for water came from all three states. Large scale projects designed to distribute the waters of the Sutlej and Beas among all three states were implemented under central direction. The involvement of the center in such an undertaking was obviously necessary given the high costs and multi-state coordination involved. With such considerations, the BBMB (Bhakra Beas Management Board) and Beas Construction Board were installed as centrally appointed representatives of the government and given wide ranging authority deemed necessary for completing the construction of the proposed Bhakra Dam as well as to unilaterally decide on any water related disputes. Given the imposition of the broad and definitive controls placed upon the states involved, the seeds of state-state and center-state conflict were sown with the Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966. A view of the decisions made by the center and the reactions by Punjab's Sikh political body, the Akali Dal, goes to the heart of the economic basis of the current political struggle.

The example of the Beas Construction Project highlights the nature of disputes between the Sikhs of Punjab and the central government. The Bhakra Dam and related Sutlej-Yamuna Canal Link (SYL), was planned under the Beas Project to divert water from the Sutlej and Beas Rivers in Punjab, to Haryana and Rajasthan.⁽¹⁷⁾ The project entailed construction of canals and dams which upset the natural layout of the land, thus presenting the problems of salination and waterlogging. Concerns as to environmental catastrophe as a result of non-state control over the system became a reality in 1988. In that year, Punjab was virtually deluged by water released from the Bhakra Dam. Eighty percent of crops were destroyed and monetary losses topping the billion dollar range with 65% of the villages in the state overrun by floodwater and 1500 people dead as a result of the flooding.⁽¹⁸⁾ The devastation suffered by Punjab in this episode was not, however, a result of nature alone. Instead, experts from Punjab Agricultural University concluded that the floods "were very much manmade with the major share of the blame due to the BBMB."⁽¹⁹⁾

Days before the Prime Minister's scheduled visit to the city of Bhakra, site of the dam involved in the flooding, the Bhakra Dam had been unnecessarily filled to its highest level ever by the BBMB to impress the Prime Minister. However, after the water rose over its already reached maximum capacity, the Board decided to release the excess waters which then flowed into the already heavy flowing Sutlej. The decision was made without warning to the residents living along the river in Punjab and the result was a disaster of enormous magnitude.

The facts of the Punjab floods of 1988 bring to the fore the most crucial aspects of the long standing Akali dispute with the center. The fact that a dam constructed to divert waters running through Punjab to a non riparian state resulted in mass destruction in Punjab highlights the issue of riparian rights. International standards as well as India's own record of adherence to riparian principles represents the essence of Sikh claims of unjust treatment of Punjab by the central government.

Traditional International Law upholds the underlying principle of Riparian law, namely, that where a river flows entirely within the territory of a state - the term 'state' applying to a territory or province within a country - it belongs entirely to that state.⁽²⁰⁾ Where a river crosses more than one state, each state owns the portion of the river crossing within its boundaries. The same principle is applied in the Indian Constitution in Entry 17 of the List to the 7th Schedule of the Constitution.⁽²¹⁾ With the given principles and law, disputes over the allocation of river waters which run through more than one territory would be subject to claims by the riparian states only, not non-riparian actors. Thus claims of Haryana and Rajashthan as to rights of waters from the three Punjab Rivers in question would be legitimate from a legal standpoint only in case they were co-riparian to the rivers in the manner described. The Indian Constitution provides for central "adjudication of disputes relating to waters of interstate rivers or river valleys."⁽²²⁾ Concerning water of a state river, i.e., water from a river contained within the boundaries of a state, the Constitution provides for irrigation and water power to be exclusively state controlled.⁽²³⁾

Regarding riparian rights, Rajasthan was denied the right to apply for usage of waters from the Narmada River, which does not flow through Rajasthan. Rajasthan was deemed not co-riparian and was also found not to be situated in the Narmada Basin, thus invalidating its request for usage of the river's waters. Significantly, Rajasthan's request for Narmada water usage despite non riparian status was based on its usage of Punjab river waters despite non riparian status as related to those waters as well. However, the official decision pointed out that Rajasthan's usage of Punjab's waters "was the result of an agreement" with Punjab.⁽²⁴⁾ Thus, riparian and states' rights regarding usage and distribution were addressed in the ruling which occurred in 1954. Riparian principle and the related state control of self contained waters was upheld when Haryana was given control of all Jamuna River waters which run through the state as part of the 1966 Punjab Reorganization Act. However, the same Act in which the riparian principles and Constitutional policy on state water rights was upheld in the case of Haryana, simultaneously commanded sending of Punjab river waters running within the state to non riparian territories, namely Haryana and Rajasthan.

The 1966 Punjab Reorganization Act laid out plans for Punjab related to its waters, specifically that of the three riparian rivers - Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas. Waters from the rivers mentioned were to be sent to the states of Haryana and Rajasthan. The Act spelled out three major provisions mentioned earlier. Central power of adjudication of disputes of water allotment, central control of all aspects of projects involving the Punjab rivers in the form of a centrally appointed commission, and central powers of project expansion involving the Punjab rivers were established. The commission acted upon the authority taken by determining that the amount of water available from the rivers was 15.85 million acre feet (MAF). The share per state given was as follows: Punjab - 3.5 MAF; Haryana - 3.5 MAF; Rajasthan - 8 MAF; Jammu + Kashmir - .65 MAF; and Delhi - .2 MAF.⁽²⁵⁾ Further, the Beas Construction Project, of which the previously cited Bhakra Dam was a part, was designed to transport the Punjab waters to the areas listed, with the majority of the related canals running through Punjab.

Punjab's objections to the plans described, and ultimately to the legitimacy of the Reorganization Act itself, were multiple. The Sikh farmers of Punjab saw the central decision taken as unjust constitutionally, unjustified economically, and dangerous environmentally.

Taking the issue of Haryana and Rajasthan as non riparian relative to the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi, Punjab pointed to the earlier 1951 Narmada River decision involving Rajasthan, as well as the more pertinent 1966 decision granting Haryana control of the Yamuna waters. The Haryana case was very much parallel to that of Punjab both in essence and timing. After the creation of Haryana, which previously formed one state with Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, Haryana was granted control of the Yamuna River riparian to the newly demarcated state. Neither of the other newly drawn states were given any rights regarding Yamuna waters as they were non riparian. However, Punjab was newly demarcated in the same Act, the areas riparian to the new Punjab, which were riparian even before partition, were planned for diversion to non riparian Haryana and Rajasthan. Given the previously listed allotments decided by the central government, 75% of Punjab waters were to be sent to non riparian states. Not only were Haryana and Rajasthan non riparian with respect to the Punjab rivers, both states lay outside the basin of the rivers. One of the reasons cited in denying Naramada waters to Rajasthan was its location beyond the basin of the river.⁽²⁶⁾

With regard to the plans for the water sent to Rajasthan, questions of economic justification are relevant. Plans to irrigate the Thar Desert with construction of the world's largest irrigation system, as laid out in the Beas Project, have been dismissed by international authorities and bodies, including the World Bank, as "dubious" and "economically unjustifiable".⁽²⁷⁾ The US Bureau of Reclamation criticized India for the plan as well. Alloys Michael, author of the book, Indus River - A Study of the Effects of Partition, wrote the following of the Thar Desert irrigation project, "Forgotten or overlooked were the fundamental differences between the Punjab, with its convergent streams, tapering doabs, and silty soil, and the Thar Desert, hundreds of miles from the Sutlej with its sand and sand dunes."⁽²⁸⁾ He concludes further, "the 8.8 MAF of Punjab River water could be utilized much more efficiently in the East Punjab."⁽²⁹⁾ By calling into question the provisions (78 - 80) of the Act, Punjab questioned the legitimacy of the Act itself. Because Punjab cited the states in question as non riparian to the rivers involved, the very authority taken by the central government in assuming control was seen as contrary to the Indian Constitution. The state is granted control of legislation and executive powers regarding a river in a given state under Articles 243 (part 3) and 162 of the Indian Constitution. Further, the center is allowed powers of legislation only in relation to interstate rivers and not concerning the water of states contained within the boundaries of the states as described above.

The effects of the 1988 floods provide perhaps the most compelling evidence in support of Punjab's claims against the central government. The fact that Punjab state suffered the ravages of the disaster, whereas the non riparian states of Haryana and Rajasthan went unscathed in the floods reinforces the notion underlying principle of Riparian law. States are given authority over dealings with their waters because just as they may gain from usage of those waters, they alone are subject to the devastation which may occur from those rivers. Given the fact of central government control over the specific dam involved in the Punjab floods, the issue of central control was also called into question.

The floods discussed earlier occurred in 1988, over 20 years after the Punjab Reorganization Act and over a decade after the violence in Punjab began. The failure to attain a judicial verdict on the river waters dispute represents the key issue in the Sikh struggle in Punjab. The Akali party in Punjab protested the implementation of sections 78-80 of the Reorganization Act from in its inception in 1966. The central government, under a State of Emergency declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, affirmed the provisions of the Act in 1976 and further expanded the authority of the center, allowing the central government to adjudicate disputes even without a request by a feuding state, as was necessary earlier.

In 1976, the Punjab State Government, under the leadership of the Akali Dal, filed a case regarding the constitutionality of the 1966 Reorganization Act. However, politics of the central government entered the picture in an authoritative way. In 1979, when Gandhi returned to power, the Punjabi State Government was dismissed and President's Rule was imposed. With Congress Party Chief Ministers in power in all three disputing states (as a result of President's Rule in Punjab), Prime Minister Gandhi gathered the Chief Ministers for a meeting at which an agreement was reached in support of the Prime Minister's 1976 affirmation of the original Reorganization Act and further expansion of central authority contained in the Act. The centrally installed Punjab Government then withdrew the case which had been pending in the Supreme Court. Later, a group of Punjabi farmers filed cases in the High Courts of both of Punjab and Haryana challenging the constitutionality of the diversion of the Punjab waters. However, two days prior to the scheduled Punjab High Court hearing, the Punjab Chief Justice overseeing the case was transferred to another state (Patna). The case was then placed on the files of the Supreme Court where it has remained since 1983, unheard by the court. The flashpoint of the Punjab crisis, the storming of the Golden Temple (Sikhism's holiest shrine) by the Indian Army, occurred in June 1984, seven months after the stifling of the 1983 court filing.

Conclusions

The violence in Punjab which followed the 1984 attack on the Golden Temple has received attention worldwide. The communalization of the Punjab conflict largely evolved as a result of the attack on the Golden Temple. The misconception that the "Sikh struggle" in India is founded on religious differences between Sikhs and Hindus is being promoted by the Indian government.

However, the grievances of the Sikhs are economic and political at the core. The unfair and incongruent treatment of Punjab as compared to other Indian states with respect to economic issues fueled the reaction of Sikhs. Repeated stifling of attempts to resolve Punjab's economic grievances, by the central government, added a dubious political element to the problems.

The centrally devised plans for application of the diverted Punjab waters have been criticized by numerous international experts as economically unjustifiable. Thus, the claim that the interests of the country as a whole are enhanced by the provisions of the Punjab Reorganization Act is invalid. Further, Punjab stands to suffer loss of land, life, and political freedom on account of unfair treatment by vested interests having power in the central government of India. Until the water rights dispute is settled equitably the Punjab crisis will continue to simmer.

1. Gurbakhash Singh, Sikhism : Under Brahmanical Siege (Ontario: Sikh Education & Research Centre of Windsor, 1992) 75.

2. M.J. Akbar, India : The Siege Within - Challenges to a Nation's Unity (New York: Penguin, 1985) 144.

3. Devinderjit Singh, "Sikhs, Arms, and Terrorism" (University of Cambridge, 1986) 2.

4. Gill 62.

5. A.A. Narang, Democracy, Development and Distortion (New Delhi: Gitanjali, 1986) 29.

6. Akbar 145.

7. Devinderjit Singh 12.

8. Akbar 170.

9. Vandana Shiva, The Violence of The Green Revolution - Ecological Degradation and Political Conflict in Punjab (Dehra Dun: Natraj, 1989) 11.

10. Shiva 17.

11. Norman K. Nicholson, "Landholding, Agricultural Modernization, and Local Institutions in India: Emphasis on Punjab: 1960-1970," Economic Development and Cultural Change 32 (1984): 574.

12. Nicholson 575-577.

13. Nicholson 576.

14. Shiva 85.

15. Shiva 107.

16. Kharak Singh, "Sikh Ideology, Fundamentalism and The Punjab Problem," Fundamental Issues in Sikh Studies, ed. Kharak Singh, G.S. Mansukhani, Jasbir Singh Mann (Chandigarh: Institute of Sikh Studies, 1992) 145.

17. Shiva 83.

18. Shiva 101.

19. Shiva 103.

20. Daljeet Singh, "Punjab River-Waters Dispute," Fundamental Issues in Sikh Studies 197.

21. Daljeet Singh 197.

22. Article 262 of Constitution of India. Quoted by Daljeet Singh, Fundamental Issues in Sikh Studies 198.

23. Daljeet Singh 198.

24. Daljeet Singh 199.

25. Shiva 107.

26. Daljeet Singh 199. (Narmada River Case cited).

27. Alloys A. Michael, Indus River - A Study of the Effects of Partition as quoted by Daljeet Singh, Fundamental Issues in Sikh Studies 209.

28. Michael, Indus River as quoted by Daljeet Singh 209.

29. Michael, Indus River as quoted by Daljeet Singh 209.


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